just as did their "right" opposition. Qualify this opposition any way you like, it is still an adaptation to injustice and collaboration with the international system of Margaret Thatcher and George Bush, which established itself during the Mitterrand years.

Stooge of the Anglo-Americans

What is most serious is that no one in France's political *nomenklatura* said anything, because, up to today, the unwritten rule of social and political success is that there is no other acceptable, possible route, aside from adaptation and collaboration. Here we see the return of the spirit of Vichy.

And that sheds light on the itinerary of François Mitterrand and the "Bousquet affair." François Mitterrand took the path of a certain section of the French bourgeoisie, always ready—as we said in 1981—to rally around Anglo-American geopolitics.

At the time of the Pétain-Churchill accords (between the end of 1940 and the end of 1942, cf. Louis Rougier *Mission Secrète à Londres*), François Mitterrand was close to Marshal Pétain. When General Giraud was in favor with the Anglo-Americans, he joined him. Then, finally, he submitted to de Gaulle, when there was no one else. Under the Fourth and Fifth Republics, he always took anti-Gaullist and anti-communist positions, and never went against London or Washington. As President, he got along with George Bush very well and, ultimately, took part in his Persian Gulf war.

He became a Resistance fighter in 1943, along with those who certainly did not want France to become a German colony, but for political, and not moral, reasons. Although they did not lack courage, political calculations and ambition were the major motivations, and passion for their country and its historical mission played a minor role.

René Bousquet, who certainly was not a "fanatical Vichyite," and otherwise wasn't even an anti-Semite, belonged to the same tendency, although he had a more exposed position in it. He was anti-Gaullist, anti-communist, and close to the very pro-British "radicalism" that many share, including in the heart of "Gaullism."

This is not to downplay René Bousquet, because what he did was abominable. It is to tell the truth about a patch of French history. It is clear that the famous "outstanding services rendered to the Resistance" by Bousquet, which the High Court referred to in its 1949 ruling, had been on its radical fringe, often Freemasonic and always pro-English. It might be very interesting to examine the documents or testimony that the High Court heard to confirm the existence of these services.

Paul Thibaud, former editor of *Esprit*, wrote in an article for the journal *Le Débat*: "The innovations credited to Mr. Mitterrand (decentralization, European integration, predominance of international law, monetary rigor), have in common being encumbrances to the capacity to govern. Mitterrand loves power, not governing."

A trip to two cities: Beijing and Nanjing

by Margrett Lin

Before I recently embarked on a visit to two cities in China, my readings of China's modern history suggested that the course of the last 200 years, especially of the last century, was one of endless disasters for China, to a degree comparable to Europe torn by two world wars.

Chinese began this century with fights against "foreign devils"—eight western powers looting the Middle Kingdom with drugs and guns. In 1911, Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his associates abolished the corrupt and decadent Qing Dynasty, but their dream of an independent republic was broken by the warlords who were backed by foreign governments.

This period led up to a direct, massive invasion by the Japanese in 1937, which only ended in 1945. For the next four years, China remained a battlefield in which Mao Zedong's communist army drove Chiang Kai-chek's Nationalist (KMT) forces from Nanjing (the Southern Capital) to the island of Taiwan.

In the first half of this century, more than 20 million Chinese died in wars.


The horrors did not stop on the mainland. Mao took power in 1949 in Beijing (the Northern Capital), and took tens of millions of lives as a result of his insane economic policies, such as the "Great Leap Forward" in the late 1950s, and radical political movements, such as the "Great Cultural Revolution" of 1966-76.

From 1949 to 1976, it is believed that at least 30 million Chinese died in the Korean War, the Great Famine, and the Cultural Revolution.

It is only against this bloody background that some Chinese could feel that the last 15 years were even, except for the unforgettable Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989, "an era of development."

Indeed, after touring Beijing and Shanghai, one would have little doubt that there have been many attempts to modernize some regions, if not the whole country.

As a first-time visitor rides from Beijing's Capital Airport to downtown on a newly built, six-lane highway surrounded by forests of skyscrapers, he will have the impression of wandering in a European metropolis. On the ring roads, small trucks, yellow cabs, and shining sedans buzz around; the nearly 1 million vehicles in the city create traffic snarls reminiscent of dragons creeping across the intersections.



The level of development in China is one of sharp contrasts, even within the cities, which are generally far advanced over the countryside. On the left, a new apartment building and huts for construction workers next to Kempinsky Hotel in Beijing; above, "old Beijing."

Inside these beltways, shopping centers are full of consumer goods—fashionable clothes, electronic gadgets, fancy furniture, cosmetics of world-name brands; next to the shops are foodstands where a cheap breakfast may cost as much as a can of cold soda, or air-conditioned restaurants where a full meal is as dear as any elegant Chinese restaurant in New York City, and extravagant disco bars where customers such as stockbrokers can easily spend US\$500 per night.

A Beijing not in the tour book

Yet there is another Beijing. If you dare to leave the air-conditioned hotel to explore areas not advertised in tour books, you will realize that tremendous work must yet be done just to "liberate an artisan from his misery."

Next to the lofty, five-star Beijing Kempinsky Hotel, a vast construction site is humming and purring from early morning to late at night.

Most of the construction workers, predominantly peasants with furrowed brows and ferocious looks on their faces, who have come to the city seeking work, live in provisional,

shabby looking red-brick huts with no running water or hygiene facilities.

Through open doors you can see small rooms with a little worn-out furniture—a hard bed, a small table, a few pots, and clothes hanging on a wall. The living room is the courtyard which serves also as the only path by the little, malodorous creek. Women do their laundry and wash their hair in the courtyard; men play pool on a pool-table under a tree.

Construction workers dine in street eateries run by "individual entrepreneurs" or peasant women who supply noodle soups or dumplings on a portable table and stools.

Behind the biggest McDonald's in Beijing (perhaps the biggest in the world), there is a street full of such eateries, closely jammed up against each other under big umbrellas, serving various foods, from crispy fish to roasted quail, prepared in front of customers.

The smell of deep-fried meat mixed with the odor of garbage dumped by the McDonalds in their backyard makes one gag who is not used to it.

Nanjing left far behind

The fate of peasants looking for a city job strikes one even more in Nanjing, which was not officially declared "an open-door city" until sometime last year, and therefore does not attract foreigners or Taiwanese, who are only keen on real estate investment.

Many construction coolies in the Nanjing area suffer under conditions worse than their cousins in Beijing—they sleep on the pavement; some men earn their living by pulling bicycle carriages loaded with coal, furniture, or waste paper, while the women try to sell a basket of vegetables or fruit brought to the city on bicycles.

Nanjing, the old capital during six dynasties yet much ignored for the past 45 years, does not even have sufficient public transportation. Bicycles, seen also in most other cities, flood the narrow streets by the thousands.

Public transportation is supplemented by privately managed mini-buses leased to operators whose only concern is a full load, not fast delivery. These mini-buses, or multi-passenger jumbo-taxis, are as big as caravans, picking up whoever is willing to pay many times what a fare would cost on a public bus.

Although passengers sweltering in the steaming hot summers find it very pleasant to be able to stop the mini-bus anywhere along the road, they are equally irritated by long delays where ticket girls yell repeatedly to pedestrians in order to grab more customers.

But even here you can sense that things are moving, especially beyond the southern outskirts of the city around the area proposed for a new international airport. The whole district, which has gone from a village, to a small town, to what is now called a new industry and technology development zone, is a satellite city of Nanjing.

It actually looks like the whole town is just one big construction site with office buildings, new apartments, department stores, and factory blocks mushrooming up—all in contrast to the primitive shelters for the peasant workers who are building the place from scratch almost with their bare hands.

The new openness of China is seen as a chance for prosperity by many Chinese, such as young engineers from the Nanjing automobile manufacturers, who expressed their hopes and excitement about new contracts to be signed with Japanese automakers to make auto parts in Nanjing.

However, if the direction of this development depends solely on the wishes of foreign investors, the rural areas may never get any benefits from it. In that case, coastal cities will be populated by millions of peasants looking for jobs and living not only in ugly red-brick huts, but also under the bridges and in shanty towns, just as in any Third World country.

Hopefully, on the next trip to China, I will see fewer peasants seeking jobs.

Russia's politicians: another 'anti-fascist'

by Roman Bessonov

The author is a Russian journalist.

Ever since Mikhail Gorbachov's early days in power, public opinion in the U.S.S.R. and then Russia has been deeply, and artificially, divided into two camps. Some magazines and newspapers, such as Nash Sovremennik and Literaturnaya Rossiya, developed Slavophile views, setting out to protect Russians from hostile ideological winds from the West and explaining economic problems as the result of evil influences from Jews or the Caucasus peoples. Ogonyok magazine and Moscow News, by contrast, declared that Russia should become a part of western civilization. They promoted antimilitarist views and admired everything foreign, calling it progressive.

Only after some years did it become clear that the new, revived "Third Rome" imperial ideology and the Russia-forsale ideology were both cooked up in the Ideology Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee. Aleksandr Degtyarev, who as deputy chief of that department supported the first nationalist movements such as *Pamyat*, was a close friend of the most active "westernist" in the CPSU, Aleksandr N. Yakovlev (director of the Ostankino television company today).

When the communist empire broke into pieces, the westernists appealed for "freedom for everybody and ourselves" and the Slavophiles declared that "Russia can do without these minorities, who only eat up our food." Russian President Boris Yeltsin, when he signed the Declaration of Independence of the Russian Federation, was obligated to both of these forces. Their struggle did not cease as he became President.

Growth of separatism

The Democratic Russia movement, which contained many young activists and a few old dissidents, existed as a united political force only until August 1991. It split at once, when it became clear that some of the democrats stood for dividing Russia into many smaller countries and others demanded an indivisible, well-armed Orthodox Russian state. Things followed a similar pattern in the political elite, with some exceptions. Politicians, having more to lose, are less