their concepts of integrated offensive operations, and began to rely on the pure and simple terror bombing of civilians. The utopian faction of the U.S. intelligence community set up the Strategic Bombing Survey, a unit designed to confirm the air power doctrine. Ironically, the Survey (which lasted into the postwar period) conclusively demonstrated that air power was really effective only on a tactical support level; the strategic bombing of infrastructure had limited effect, and the massive terror bombing of civilians was next to useless.

Despite these and other similar findings, the most utopian version of air power ideas became dominant in the United States after the war. The reason? Just as Wells predicted: the atomic bomb. The combination of the aircraft and the A-bomb represented the "absolute weapon," it was argued, demanding wholly different kinds of strategic thinking. The Air Force was granted its independence as the "fourth arm," and, despite the fact that the USAF was then, and is now, staffed by the most patriotic of Americans, that branch became a plague vector for utopianism.

Key to this was the Air Force's creation of Project RAND, eventually the independent Rand Corp. Realizing that bombers could eventually be replaced by rockets, and wanting to make sure that the air forces never lost their new-found dominance, Army Air Forces Chief of Staff Hap Arnold tasked Rand with one mission: What will the atomic weapons of the future look like, and how might they be delivered? The earliest Rand staffers used this brief as an opportunity to dump classical military ideas, like those of Clausewitz, and to go whole-hog into scenario-mongering and gaming. Because atomic weapons are "absolute," it was argued, the simulation of their possible use was more important than strategy.

John von Neumann was brought into Rand to develop the games section. Soon, how one used the simulations themselves became an independent discipline at Rand, called "strategic systems analysis"—which came into general use under the name "systems analysis."

The tragic effects of Rand's utopian influence became clear in the Vietnam War, where a company commander could not call for air support until he had checked with the Pentagon directly: Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, a systems analysis fanatic, had to make sure that such support was within the parameters of the currently running scenario!

Almost all of today's video combat simulations for the civilian population are based on hardware and software originally funded by Rand and the Air Force, for military use. Simulation training, like chess, has its uses. However, the dominance of computerized scenario games in every pore of today's U.S. society could never have occurred without the takeover of U.S military thinking by H.G. Wells's soulless utopian ideas.

The genocidalist who built video games

The "blast 'em" computer video games of today all derive from a U.S. Air Force project in the late 1940s to develop realistic flight simulators.

The U.S. Air Force had pioneered the use of computers. However, the need for realistic computerized simulation demanded a much faster system than that based on the analog technology of the immediate postwar period. The USAF heavily funded a team at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), under electrical engineer Jay Forrester, to develop new methods. Forrester came up with "Whirlwind," the first high-speed digital computer.

From the beginning of the 1950s, USAF planners became increasingly enamored with the cybernetics ideology being fed to them by the RAND Corp.—especially ideas about "man-machine interface." The Air Force wanted a complete radar network to guard against Soviet bombers, but it became convinced that human operators could not handle the volume of information. Forrester was tasked with creating SAGE (Semi Automatic Ground Environment), which allowed digital computers to analyze information before it was delivered to the human beings. The long process of getting the human beings and their moral compunctions "out of the loop" had begun.

Forrester was so impressed by the success with which his digital computers seemed to simulate combat, that he left MIT's computer lab and moved to the same university's Sloan School of Management. There, he developed an idea he named "system dynamics," which purported to model global society, including ecological and population dynamics. But, as the saying goes, "garbage in, garbage out." Forrester's model incorporated the Malthusian ideology of limited natural resources; therefore, his model's output could only confirm that overpopulation was the world's biggest problem.

This appealed to the so-called Club of Rome, the Malthusian group that sponsored Forrester and Dennis Meadows to write *Limits to Growth* in 1971. Throughout the 1970s, the Club of Rome and its environmental-extremist friends extensively used *Limits* to give a scientific veneer to their attempts to shut down industry and to commit genocide against "overpopulated" parts of the Third World. It is telling that Lyndon and Helga LaRouche and their collaborators spent considerable effort during the 1970s explicitly attacking *Limits,* and combatting the ideology behind it.

The digital technology Forrester developed lives on, in the innards of all of today's video games.