

American Revolution and the American System since the founding of the Republic. Aaron Burr, the assassin of the first Treasury Secretary, Alexander Hamilton, embodied the British treason on Wall Street.

Burr, who fell one vote short of becoming President of the United States, was an agent of Jeremy Bentham and Lord Shelburne, America's leading British adversaries in the American Revolution. Shelburne ran the "Secret Committee" of the British East India Company and pioneered Britain's opium war policy. He nearly succeeded in wrecking the nascent United States by Anglo-American free-trade subversion, before the nation was saved at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia.

During the 19th century, City of London-Wall Street figure Martin Van Buren did become President of the United States, after running the Presidency of Andrew Jackson. August Belmont, the formal representative of the British Rothschild family interests on Wall Street, was, for decades, the head of the Democratic Party, from which position he played a pivotal role in launching the Southern secessionist drive to break up America's noble experiment.

In other words, Wall Street, throughout American history, has been an epicenter of British treason. In the World War II and postwar periods, the names Stimson, McCloy, and Bundy deserve the same "Made in the City of London" label as Burr, Van Buren, Belmont, et al. did earlier.

Real power centers

The power of the Wall Street crowd today is still widely misunderstood. From key positions in banking, academia, the media, and, especially, the legal profession, the leaders of "the liberal establishment" exert extraordinary power over our elected officials. Their real centers of power inside the government are not, however, as most people foolishly believe, in the CIA. Look instead at the Department of Justice, particularly the permanent bureaucracy, which is run, from outside the government, by Wall Street lawyers. Look at the "white shoe" bureaucrats of the State Department, whom FDR labeled as "more British than the British." Years ago, LaRouche referred to this Wall Street apparatus as "the real CIA."

This Wall Street component of the BAC complex is far from invincible. Just consider that it is the Wall Street establishment which has produced two generations of George Bushes who have stumbled and blundered their way across the American political stage.

To the extent that more and more citizens of this Republic, and nations around the world, come to understand this BAC phenomenon, and the idea that much of Wall Street serves at the beck and call of London, this leviathan can be soundly defeated, particularly as *their* post-Bretton Woods, would-be one-world system moves ever closer to the point of evaporation. Hence, *EIR's* continuing commitment to provide you with the necessary historical ammunition to help defeat this alien virus.

Book Review

How the Bundy family ruined America

by Stu Rosenblatt

The Color of Truth

by Kai Bird

New York, Simon & Schuster, 1998

496 pages, hardbound

Gray is the color of truth.

—McGeorge Bundy, May 1967 speech about Vietnam at the Cosmos Club, Washington, D.C.

Despite President Bill Clinton's generally good intentions, U.S. foreign policy, as steered by his so-called Principals Committee, is drifting in the direction of war. Following disastrous and senseless military operations against Iraq and Serbia, U.S. relations with Russia and China—two countries with which the President has sought a partnership—have run aground. Secessionist wars are raging in Russia's Northern Caucasus, in the volatile India-Pakistan border region of Kashmir, and in the Pacific archipelago. The British drive to extend NATO to the borders of Russia, coincident with an ambitious raw-materials grab by London-centered cartels in the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia, are driving Russia to contemplate a new military doctrine based on the limited use of nuclear weapons.

The warning signs are all there. If current trends are not soon reversed, the United States and the world may be on an unstoppable path toward a nuclear war.

We are dangerously close to repeating, step by step, the mistakes made four decades ago, when we blundered into the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War, this time with potentially more catastrophic consequences. Then, as now, we had a President, John F. Kennedy, who was personally opposed to such a war-vectored policy, but who was continuously undercut and betrayed by a crew of formal and informal "advisers" more loyal to Britain and to British geopolitical thinking than to their Commander in Chief.

If we are to avoid a repeat of the disasters and blunders of the past, we must break the vise-grip on American policymaking enjoyed by what Lyndon LaRouche has labelled the British-American-Commonwealth (BAC) cabal.

Kai Bird's *The Color of Truth* offers us a timely opportunity to take a fresh look at a painful period that generated the axiomatic changes in our national makeup that led us to the current disaster. Only by rooting out those false assumptions can we hope to replace them with more promising ideas, drawn from the rich tradition of the American System of political economy and diplomacy.

Four crucial moments

Bird's book is a useful overview of the actions of the brothers William and McGeorge Bundy, during the period of their strongest influence — 1950-75 — on American foreign and national security policy. This review examines four crucial moments in the Bundy boys' careers, which account for the dramatic shift in U.S. cultural and political values that has left us in crisis today:

1. the role of McGeorge Bundy in covering up the real story behind the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki;
2. the treacherous actions taken by McGeorge Bundy's National Security Council in nearly provoking a thermonuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis;
3. the central role played by Bundy and his accomplice, Robert Strange McNamara, in escalating the war in Vietnam; and
4. the role of McGeorge Bundy at the Ford Foundation, in launching the so-called anti-war movement and the drug-rock-sex counterculture.

Unlike Bird, we do not turn a blind eye to the determining role of the British oligarchy as the senior partner in shaping the outlook and actions of the Bundys and their collaborators. This fatal weakness in American historiography must be corrected immediately, or any chance for our nation's survival will be hopelessly compromised.

Both Bundys acted as thoroughly assimilated members of the British establishment. McGeorge Bundy's every move was shaped by such hard-core Anglophiles as H.G. Wells's acolyte Walter Lippmann, intelligence operative William Yandell Elliott, and Winston Churchill/Rothschild family agent Sir Isaiah Berlin. Bill Bundy, son-in-law of British admiral Dean Acheson, strode about the Defense and State departments in imitation of British foreign officers, even down to the garb.

The Bundys traced their origins back to the Tories who opposed the American Revolution and fought to undermine the early republic.¹

Hiroshima and Nagasaki: a criminal falsification

World War II ended with the militarily unjustified nuclear annihilation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As has been thor-

1. Anton Chaitkin, *Treason in America: From Aaron Burr to Averell Harriman*, 2nd edition (Washington, D.C.: Executive Intelligence Review, 1999).

oughly documented by LaRouche, Bird, and others, the Japanese were prepared to surrender as early as the spring of 1945, but the war was deliberately prolonged to ensure that the atomic bomb would be dropped on a civilian population, for strategic reasons. The British and their American henchmen, including Secretary of War Henry Stimson, wanted to terrorize the world into capitulating to a postwar form of world government.

President Franklin Roosevelt had envisioned a postwar world devoid of colonialism, an outlook totally at odds with that of his adversary, Winston Churchill, who wanted to restore the British Empire. With the malleable Harry Truman in the White House, the British sought to carry out Wells's perspective of a world terrorized by the threat of atomic bombing, submitting to their new world order — what Lippmann knew as Wells's "New Republic."

Once the bomb had been dropped, it was imperative that that criminal, needless action be defended as having legitimacy. The threat of nuclear attack and the will to launch were at the center of the new strategic doctrine. As LaRouche emphasized in "Congress Revisits the ABM Treaty" (*EIR*, Aug. 20, 1999), the issue was not nuclear weapons per se, but the implementation of a new strategic doctrine. "So, from Hiroshima onward, the hegemonic Anglo-American strategic doctrine, was the [Bertrand] Russell dogma of nuclear weapons, as nothing other than a scheme to establish world government under joint domination by London and London's Wall Street cronies," LaRouche wrote.

If the central falsehood, that the bombing of Hiroshima was militarily necessary, could not be maintained, then the whole scheme would unravel and, in fact, could be turned against its perpetrators. Therefore, the typical justifications offered included the following: Dropping the bomb obviated the need for a U.S. invasion of Japan, saved lives, and was carried out after careful consideration of all options.

The tissue of lies began to unravel after the war, when Pulitzer Prize-winning author John Hersey published an article in the *New Yorker* magazine in August 1946, simply entitled "Hiroshima." Its publication caused an immediate sensation, and the justification for having used the bomb was about to be broken.

Two major pieces were written to combat the breach: an essay by Henry Stimson, which appeared in *Harpers* magazine in January 1947, and Stimson's biography, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, which appeared one year later. Both works were scribbled in large measure by McGeorge Bundy, the 27-year-old son of Stimson's aide de camp, Harvey Bundy. The *Harpers* article followed an outline provided by Harvard president and atomic project insider James Conant. This work was also scripted by Harvey Bundy. The Bundys and the Stimsons were close family friends, and McGeorge was assigned the project.

Both works retailed the Big Lie. McGeorge Bundy knew that it had not been necessary to drop the bomb, that the Japanese were already suing for peace, that no land invasion



In these two photos printed in *The Color of Truth*, McGeorge Bundy lectures President Johnson at his farewell party in February 1966 (right), and Walt Rostow, William Bundy, Cyrus Vance, and Dwight Eisenhower are shown with President Johnson on April 18, 1968, shortly after he had decided not to seek reelection. Johnson, who had been continually bullied by the Bundys to stay in the war, faced a growing anti-war movement that was funded—by McGeorge Bundy.

of Japan was needed, and that the use of the atomic bomb had not been supported by leading military commanders. But, Bundy and company concocted, out of thin air, the fabrication that the bomb saved the lives of 1 million U.S. soldiers. This lie has been the standard now for more than 50 years.

The method of lying

In *The Color of Truth*, Kai Bird exposes the method of lying permeating the Bundy-Stimson collaboration as they concocted the “bomb saved lives” story: “In his ‘note of explanation and acknowledgment’ at the end of Stimson’s memoirs, Bundy provides a brief description of how the book was written. He states that Stimson’s ‘diary has been liberally quoted. . . .’ And yet, curiously, when his narrative comes to dealing with the decision to use the bomb against Japan, Bundy quotes from the diary very little. The omissions are so startling that one must conclude that Bundy and Stimson were intent on suppressing any suggestion in the memoirs that the bomb was used for any reasons other than military necessity” (p. 95).

The final proof of the deliberate invention of the Big Lie came 40 years later, from Bundy himself. The strategic direction had changed, and Bundy was now a leader of the “disarmament” faction in the establishment. In 1988, Bundy published *Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years*, in which he grudgingly admitted the falsification: He defended the decision to use the bomb as “understandable,” but admitted that the motivation was political,

not military.

As Bird puts it: “A delay on the atomic bombing of Nagasaki ‘would have been relatively easy, and I think right.’ Regarding the undocumented casualty estimate of ‘over a million,’ Bundy writes that ‘defenders of the use of the bomb, Stimson among them, were not always careful about numbers of casualties expected. Revisionist scholars are on strong ground when they question flat assertions that the bomb saved a million lives’ ” (p. 97).

In 1985, Bundy laid bare the duplicity surrounding the decision to use the atomic bomb, in an interview on the MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour on the 40th anniversary of the bombing. “I am not disposed to criticize the use of the existence of the bomb to help to end the war, but it does seem to me, looking back on it, that there were opportunities for communication and warning available to the United States government which were not completely thought through by our government at that time. In July and early August 1945, the United States government knew three things that the Japanese government did not. One was that the bomb was coming into existence, had been successfully tested. One was that the United States government was prepared to allow the emperor to remain on his throne in Japan, and the third was that the Russians were coming into the war. And the question, it seems to me, that was not fully studied, fully presented to President Truman, was whether warning of the bomb and assurance on the emperor could not have been combined in a fashion which would have produced Japanese surrender without the use of

the bomb on a large city, with all the human consequences that followed” (pp. 97-98).

The issue here was not merely one of deceit, but, as LaRouche elaborated in “Congress Revisits the ABM Treaty,” the crucial idea was that “for reasons of state,” evil fairy tales are fabricated, and nations go to their doom defending these myths. In 1945, the United States could have pursued Franklin Roosevelt’s postwar vision of a world of republican nation-states collaborating for the pursuit of economic and political progress. That constellation of forces would have been anti-colonialist, especially anti-British, and would have constituted a return to the outlook of President John Quincy Adams and his philosophical heirs. Instead, we took the path of a return to the colonial outlook of the reorganized British Empire. That path was steered by Henry Stimson, Dean Acheson, John McCloy, and other leaders of the Anglophile U.S. foreign policy establishment.

BAC rite of passage

Harvey Bundy’s sons, were in effect, born into the BAC.² They were the postwar, “next generation” of British agents of influence who set the republic on a course toward a Russellite one-world government, technological stagnation—and the possible obliteration of the human race.

During 1948-60, McGeorge Bundy was passed from one BAC leader to another for polishing. He was already a nasty, impudent snob. One thing did stand out from his undergraduate days at Yale: Contrary to the traditional Anglophile profile, he majored not in government, but in mathematics. In

2. The American side of the BAC is composed of three interrelated groups: the Boston Brahman slave and opium traders, the Wall Street bankers and lawyers, and the Confederate planters and agrarian aristocracy. The Bundys hail from the Boston apparatus. McGeorge and Bill’s mother was a Putnam, who married into the Lowell family. As Anton Chaitkin recounts in *Treason in America*, the Lowells descend from the treasonous Judge John Lowell, a prominent Boston Tory, who aided and abetted the British during the American Revolution, joined the New England Secessionists and opium-smugglers in the early 19th century, and generally plotted to return America to British rule. The Lowells became a prominent pillar in the Boston aristocracy. As Bird cites the famous 1910 quip, “And this is good old Boston, / The home of the bean and the cod, / Where the Lowells talk to the Cabots, / And the Cabots talk only to God” (p. 27).

Harvey Bundy, Bill and McGeorge’s father, was of moderate means, but his marriage propelled him into the upper ranks of the BAC. He attended Yale, where he was a member of the Skull and Bones secret society, went through the Plattsburgh Training Camps, and eventually became chief aide to Henry Stimson. McGeorge and Bill followed the same road: Groton, Yale, Skull and Bones, World War II intelligence operations. Bill was stationed in England during the war as a director of the Ultra code-breaking operation, and McGeorge was also an intelligence operator. While in England, Bill became thoroughly assimilated, aping all that was British, down to the clothing of a “proper” British Empire man. Bill Bundy married arch-Anglophile Dean Acheson’s daughter, and McGeorge was all but raised at the feet of Stimson. He was quickly placed in the “right” social and political circles. Thus, with the Bundy entry to power, *Treason in America* comes full circle.

1948, Bundy worked for Walter Lippmann, a devotee of H.G. Wells who turned Bundy into an admirer of British free-market economics and 19th-century British social welfare policies.³

Lippmann brought Bundy into Thomas Dewey’s Presidential campaign later that year, where Bundy worked with Allen and John Foster Dulles in various dirty tricks operations against Harry Truman.

During 1949-60, Bundy was placed in Harvard University, first in the Government Department, and later, as Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences. His original controller was avowed Anglophile William Yandell Elliott. As Dean of Harvard, Bundy built it into a major center for the intrusion of British geopolitics into American policymaking. Harvard became an Anglophile zoo, with such geopolitical fanatics as Samuel P. Huntington, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Henry Kissinger all recruited by Bundy.⁴

During this period, Bundy was following Bertrand Russell’s lead, “reinventing” himself as a “ban the bomb” disarmament fanatic. Earlier, Russell had been a loud advocate of a preemptive nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. However, once Moscow had developed its own hydrogen bomb, Russell shifted to the nuclear disarmament/Mutually Assured Destruction track, launching outfits like the Pugwash Conference, and, later, Bundy’s own International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, to facilitate the one-world agenda.

Bundy was deployed directly into the nascent arms control movement. In 1952, the Oppenheimer Panel on arms control met in Bundy’s living room in Cambridge, Massachusetts, with Bundy serving as rapporteur. Ironically, the committee was composed of many of the individuals who only years earlier had orchestrated the Hiroshima/Nagasaki bombing, including Robert Oppenheimer, Vannevar Bush, Allen Dulles, and Harvard President James Conant.

Bundy authored the concluding report of this group, which outlined the now-familiar litany urging “no first use” of nuclear weapons, nuclear test bans, and nuclear disarmament.

As part of his retooling, Bundy later deployed Kissinger

3. Ronald Steel, *Walter Lippmann and the American Century* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1998). Lippmann was a fawning admirer of H.G. Wells. He was an original member of the editorial board of the *New Republic*, a magazine launched to promote Wells’s utopian conception of an oligarchical order. The title of the magazine was lifted from Wells’s writings calling for the “men of the New Republic” to run civilization.

4. Two other things of note surround Bundy’s tenure at Harvard. First, he taught a much-ballyhooed class on “The Lessons of Munich,” in which he counterposed the tough, interventionist approach of Stimson to the softness of Chamberlain. He cited the incident *ad nauseam* while in the White House (as he escalated various crises), and would refer to this comparison for the rest of his life. Second, Bundy, Elliott, and Kissinger all served as FBI informants during the McCarthy witch-hunts of the early 1950s. Bird unearthed documents identifying these men, not as liberal defenders of free speech, but as thugs for the FBI throughout the era, intimidating faculty members, forcing lecturers to take various oaths, and, on several occasions, running faculty out of the school (p. 131).

from Harvard to New York to chair the New York Council on Foreign Relations panel on nuclear arms and disarmament, which issued all the findings and reports that led to the creation of the Arms Control and Disarmament bureaucracy inside the government.

Bundy and Kennedy

In the Kennedy administration (1961-63), Bundy served as chairman of the National Security Council (NSC). From that perch, he tried to sabotage every tendency on the part of President Kennedy to return the United States to the policies of FDR.

The administration was bitterly divided from the outset. The New Deal-FDR democrats included Arthur Schlesinger, John K. Galbraith, Arthur Goldberg, Orville Freeman, Chester Bowles, and others. They were at odds with the BAC group of Bundy, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, Douglas Dillon, and Allen Dulles.

Bundy's National Security Council became a center of BAC intrigue. He brought in many of his Harvard academic blowhards, including Carl Kaysen, Walt Rostow, Robert "Blowtorch" Komer, Marcus Raskin, Dave Klein, and Kissinger.

As National Security Adviser, Bundy aped the modus operandi of classic Venetian agents, alternating among flattery, manipulation, and brute force. Over the six years that he held the position, Bundy played the role of Iago—the manipulative courtier—to perfection.

While serving in the Kennedy and the Lyndon Johnson White House, Bundy was at the height of his prowess. He was the prototypical Boston elitist of Tory persuasion. He was known for his vicious, sardonic wit and compulsive, manic "decisiveness." He blundered his way from one fiasco to another.

The guiding principle in Bundy's operation was the witting destruction of the United States as a sovereign nation-state. Bundy, McNamara, and company operated within the assumptions of the Churchill-orchestrated Cold War, to destroy the United States and ruin relations with wartime allies France, Russia, and China.

The Cold War was typified by the British-created NATO apparatus, the "containment" doctrine of George Kennan, and the machinations of Bertrand Russell and the Pugwashers. The immediate purpose was to pit the Warsaw Pact against the NATO alliance in a confrontation of wills, induce them to destroy one another, and then be superseded by a world government modelled on the works of Wells and Russell.

Bundy, playing the role of both the Stimsonian hawk and the Oppenheimer arms-control advocate, was a pivotal figure in executing the entire operation.

The sabotage began in 1961 when Allen Dulles launched the militarily insane Bay of Pigs operation, and followed it

up with the equally lunatic Operation Mongoose. Mongoose was a massive, anti-Castro covert operation that assembled a collection of hit-men and black-bag specialists. (It anticipated the Iran-Contra apparatus of George Bush.) Bundy chaired the highly secretive Special Group Augmented (SGA), an interagency task force of State Department, CIA, and Defense Department personnel that carried out the clandestine campaign. The SGA was later revived as Bush's "Special Situation Group."

Bundy's response to the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion was to escalate. He argued that the disaster occurred because they had not been pragmatic enough. He wrote Kennedy: "Cuba was a bad mistake. But it was not a disgrace and there were reasons for it. If we set our critics on the left and right against each other they would eat each other up, and we already know more about what went wrong and why than any of them. . . . Against our hopes and our responsibilities, Cuba is a nitpick—it must not throw us off-balance. . . . [Our true friends] now fear that because of Cuba we may turn back to cautious inactivity" (p. 200.).

And so, Bundy escalated, launching Operation Mongoose in earnest, and also stationing nuclear weapons in Turkey.

Falling into the British-designed psychological trap, Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchov responded in kind, shipping nuclear missiles and parts to Cuba. What followed was the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which Russell attempted to personally mediate between Washington and Moscow.

Bundy, Cuba, and 'Apocalypse Then'

The Cuban Missile Crisis was the opening traumatic shock of the 1960s, the murder of the President was the second, and the Warren Commission cover-up of the conspiracy behind Kennedy's murder was the third. McGeorge Bundy was in the middle of it all.

In the early 1960s, the Cuban Missile Crisis was the first major shock directed against the American public and the world, with profound results. The world would appear to come within inches of nuclear annihilation, an entire generation would be forever scarred, and the United States would be radically restructured to reflect the brazen BAC power-grab over all major areas of policymaking.

It is necessary here to sketch the actions of McGeorge Bundy and his brother. During the entire incident, the worst roles were played by Bundy and his two mentors, Dean Acheson and John McCloy, both members of the orchestrating group, the Ex-Com (Executive Committee).

At the outset, President Kennedy was very cautious, and leaned toward a blockade of Cuba. Bundy argued instead for limited air strikes against Cuban missiles. On Oct. 17, Bundy flipped, and voted in the Ex-Com for the blockade. On Oct. 19, he flopped; under pressure from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Bundy called for a massive air strike of 800 sorties against Cuban and Russian positions. William Bundy, then an Undersecretary of Defense, argued for the same. In the Ex-Com, the

air strikes were strenuously promoted by McCloy and Acheson.

Ultimately, Bundy and Acheson were outvoted, a blockade was initiated, and the world took a step back from the brink. Kennedy also flatly rejected Russell's offer to mediate.

In the aftermath of the affair, Secretary of Defense McNamara made a telltale observation: "There is no such thing as strategy, only crisis management" (p. 244). It has been precisely this kind of thinking that has characterized the disasters in American foreign policy ever since.

Once the crisis was over, McCloy reentered the picture as an arms-control negotiator, and several historic agreements were concluded with the Russians. The McCloy-Zorin accords shifted the world radically in the direction of arms control and disarmament, advancing the Russell-Wells-Pugwash agenda of world government.

The brink of nuclear war

Bird has unearthed a critical piece of the missile crisis picture, indicating Bundy's recklessness: "At the time Bundy and his colleagues believed that while the Soviets probably had not had the time to ship and mount nuclear warheads atop their missiles, they nevertheless had to assume that some warheads were present. Not until 1989-91 did scholars learn the facts: according to Soviet General of the Army Anatoli I. Gribkov, who helped to plan the 1962 Cuban operation, 36 nuclear warheads for medium-range missiles — and 158 tactical nuclear warheads — had made it to Cuba prior to the blockade. Gribkov also revealed that the Soviet commander in Cuba had been given discretionary authority to use the tactical nuclear weapons against any U.S. invasion force. This authorization was not withdrawn until Oct. 22, 1962 — the day President Kennedy revealed the existence of the missiles. And even then, according to Gribkov, a few days later the warheads for these tactical weapons were moved from storage and dispersed to Soviet combat units in preparation for the expected U.S. invasion. Obviously, in the heat of battles, they might well have been used even without direct authorization from Moscow."

Bird continued: "Bundy and McNamara were shocked at these revelations. They had also assumed that there were no more than 20,000 Soviet troops on the island; in fact, there were over 41,000. If Kennedy had ordered an air strike — which in all probability would have led to an invasion — U.S. troops might have been met on the beaches with tactical nuclear weapons. In this event, the odds that the crisis would have escalated to a full strategic nuclear exchange rise dramatically. Humanity should be extremely grateful that Kennedy did not accept the advice of Acheson, Nitze, the Joint Chiefs, and Bundy to take the missiles out with an air strike" (p. 245).

President Kennedy's refusal to go along with Bundy's missile crisis confrontation placed him in the cross-hairs of those in London who were most aggressively pushing the one-world Pugwash agenda.

Subsequently, in June 1963, Kennedy delivered a policy address at American University, in which he proclaimed that the United States would pursue a policy of "peace through strength" (a slogan later adopted by Ronald Reagan). Kennedy vowed that the United States would pursue a war-winning military doctrine (anathema to the Russellites), including the development of ballistic-missile defense, but would use the position of superiority to sue for an end of the Cold War and a new partnership with Moscow. Kennedy signalled that he was making a major turn, back to the policies of FDR. Five months later he was dead, the victim of a British assassination cabal.

The Color of Truth sheds no real light on Bundy's role, if any, in the November 1963 assassination of John Kennedy, but it does report on Bundy's curious behavior after the murder.

Bundy mourned only briefly; he was soon back at the White House, "serving" President Johnson. Bundy, a fervent promoter of covert actions of all types, blocked any investigation into the assassination. Indeed, as the President's body was being flown back to Washington from Dallas, Bundy was issuing official statements that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone assassin.

The establishment ran the infamous Warren Commission, with two of Bundy's mentors, McCloy and Dulles, personally directing the cover-up.

Bundy's Vietnam War

The next "shock trauma" of the decade was the war in Vietnam, and again, McGeorge Bundy played a decisive, evil role in the matter. At all points, he (and his brother also) knew the war on the ground could not be won, and yet counselled escalation. Five issues stand out.

1. This war was a British colonial campaign, modelled almost explicitly on Lord Louis Mountbatten's operations in colonial Malaya from the end of World War II until 1958.

2. The war grew naturally out of the suicidal economic policies pursued domestically and internationally during the 1960s. Following the assassination of President Kennedy, the United States turned away from the kinds of investments in science and technology, typified by the Kennedy space program, and toward the Great Society social engineering programs of the Johnson administration. Bundy opposed industrial progress as the basis for U.S. policy, including foreign policy; only brutal colonial methods in pursuit of "Cold War aims" were to be tolerated.

3. The Vietnam War was a "surrogate war," fought not only against the Soviet Union, but also against China. This conformed to Britain's goal of preventing any American rapprochement with either of the two communist states.

4. Hence, all proposals by French President Charles de Gaulle to mediate the conflict in favor of an alternative set of

global alliances, pivoted on de Gaulle's emerging entente with Russia and China, were forbidden. De Gaulle's lobbying for a "neutralist" answer in Indochina was categorically rejected.

5. No military strategy for total war, in the tradition of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, would be tolerated; nor would there be a "just war" orientation, to winning the peace by rebuilding Indochina. This war was a very typically British "meatgrinder" conflict, modelled on the Boer War in colonial South Africa. Casualties would be high, diplomacy would replace traditional war-winning strategies, and the morale and fighting ability of the United States would be destroyed in the process.

Thus, the ultimate result of this military conflict would be the demoralization and destruction of the identity and purpose of the U.S. military and our nation as a whole. We would instead be grafted onto the decrepit remains of the British Empire. And, the door to the New Age "cultural revolution" of the 1970s would be opened.

The Color of Truth makes abundantly clear that both President Kennedy and his brother Robert rejected the idea of a protracted military intervention into Vietnam. President Kennedy was no peacenik, but he instinctively realized that the Vietnam conflict, even in 1961, was already a deadly trap.

Kennedy searches for an exit strategy

By 1963, Kennedy was looking for an exit strategy that would obviate the need for a U.S. ground war, and he was also seriously considering President de Gaulle's neutralist solution for Vietnam.⁵ Bird details this as follows:

"As [Roger] Hilsman, [Arthur] Schlesinger and others have related anecdotally, Kennedy had a strong aversion to Americanizing the war. He had, after all, repeatedly resisted sending combat troops, as opposed to 'advisers.' Recall that in the spring of 1962, Michael Forrestal [son of the former Defense Secretary and a staff member on Bundy's National Security Council] had noted in his memorandum of conversation with Kennedy and Harriman, 'The President observed generally that he wished us to be prepared to seize upon any favorable moment to reduce our involvement, recognizing that the moment might yet be some time away.'

"When Kenneth O'Donnell once asked Kennedy how he could withdraw the American forces, Kennedy said, 'Easy, put a government in there that will ask us to leave.' Robert Kennedy told Daniel Ellsberg in October 1967, 'Of course no one can know what my brother would have done in 1964 or 1965, but I do know he was determined not to send ground troops. He would rather do anything than that.' When Ellsberg pressed him, 'But was he prepared to see Saigon go communist?' Bobby replied, 'We would have fuzzed it up, the way we did in Laos.' When Ellsberg asked, 'What made your brother so smart?' Bobby suddenly flared and shouted, 'Be-

5. Mary Burdman, "De Gaulle, JFK, and Stopping War: A Lesson for Today," *EIR*, April 16, 1999.

cause we were there! We were there. We saw what happened to the French.' Indeed the Kennedy brothers had visited Vietnam together back in 1951 and had come away disillusioned with the French effort in Indochina" (pp. 259-60).

However, once Kennedy was conveniently out of the way, Bundy and McNamara escalated the conflict. Their guiding idea is really only touched upon in Bird's book: The model for Vietnam was not the French effort in Indochina, as has been many times alleged. Rather, it was the British effort, especially that of Lord Louis Mountbatten, in combatting the so-called "insurgency" in colonial Malaya. Forrestal outlined this in a 1964 memo. According to Bird:

"Everyone kept saying [in 1964 that] the war had to be won in the South, but Northern intervention might first have to be ended. A couple of weeks later Forrestal restated the position he and Bundy basically shared: 'As in most insurgency situations, South Vietnam is undergoing a kind of social revolution. At the same time, she is being attacked from the North. Therefore, we have had to learn not only how to defend against armed terrorism, but also how to effect fundamental changes in the political and economic structure of the country. This is a tall order, but the British experience in Malaya⁶ and the Philippine experience with the Huk rebellion has proven that it can be done, if outside intervention is controlled.'

"This two pronged strategy—interdicting the terrorism exported from the North while waging a social revolution in the South—would become Washington's policy in Vietnam for the remainder of Mac Bundy's tenure in the White House. The logic required additional Americans on the ground, ostensibly not in combat roles, but to wage the pacification effort

6. British policy in Malaya at the end of World War II became a model for counterinsurgency operations. During the war, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), a largely indigenous Chinese entity nominally run by Chin Peng, was allied with the British government, to defeat Japan. After the war, rather than grant independence to the mineral-rich area, the British reasserted colonial control. In response, the MCP mounted a guerrilla insurgency, and the British moved quickly to crush it. Counterinsurgency measures were run directly by Churchill. First, the British created numerous "ethnic" political groupings and played them off one against the other. The British forcibly "resettled" the indigenous ethnic Chinese, so-called "squatters," who had been supporting the insurgents, ultimately relocating more than 500,000 people. Next, the British alternated between harsh social control measures and liberal political freedoms to turn the squatters against the MCP. The British recruited a core of indigenous Malays to prosecute the war against the MCP—a war which the British eventually won.

However, crucial elements of the Malaysia situation were different than that in Vietnam. The MCP and the squatters, both ethnic Chinese, were a minority of the population, and the rest of the population was gradually manipulated against the MCP. In Vietnam, where there were no major ethnic divisions to exploit, the population had already been politically united by Ho Chi Minh. Plus, the artificially divided Vietnam had a puppet government in the South, a superimposed oligarchical structure, and all of the negatives associated with the South Vietnamese experiment. Nevertheless, Bundy was determined to apply the lessons of Malaya, where the British had created strategic hamlets (i.e., the relocated squatters), had cordoned off the supply lines to the MCP, and had created indigenous political leadership inside Malaya.

that the South Vietnamese generals seemed incapable of winning” (p. 282).

This became the idea behind the escalated bombing of North Vietnam, the intentional bombing of Cambodia by Bundy-boy Kissinger in 1970, and the various “strategic hamlet” or “Vietnamization” idiocies imposed on the South Vietnamese puppet governments, to force them to take responsibility for conducting the war. This error in thinking, induced by fascination with British colonial operations, led to our national nightmare.

To achieve these ends, Bundy, McNamara, and, later, Kissinger, continuously escalated the war. Bundy authorized the assassinations of Ngo Dinh Diem, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and Duong Van Minh (Big Minh), all of whom sought, to one degree or another, to create a neutral Vietnam that could be reunited. In all probability, this would have ended the war—and thus, it was intolerable to the BAC Cold Warriors.

In 1964, Bundy’s National Security Council ran the covert operations that provoked the Gulf of Tonkin incident, which led to the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam. In January 1965, Bundy travelled to South Vietnam, and witnessed the attack on U.S. troops at Pleiku. He used the incident to bludgeon President Johnson into launching Operation Rolling Thunder, the sustained bombing campaign against the North.

Bundy needed only to whisper a few words into the ear of the President to get the desired results; Johnson admitted just before he died in 1973, that he had been terrorized by the knowledge that “we had a God-damned Murder, Inc.” operating directly out of the government’s national security structures.

At each branching point, it was Bundy and McNamara who escalated the war. They initiated the ground campaign and expanded its scope, and later launched the “pacification” programs that led to unspeakable slaughter and stiffened resistance from the population.

Economic underpinnings of the Vietnam disaster

The situation created by Bundy and McNamara contained within it a fatal paradox. In order for South Vietnam, an artificial creation, to stand on its own, to “win the hearts and minds” of the population, it needed to pursue economic and social policies in the self-interest of the nation. This was never allowed, and the disastrous economic policies contributed heavily to the failed military action.

In May 1964, Forrestal, Bundy’s assistant for Vietnam, recognized the dilemma. Bird writes: “The problem, Forrestal believed, was economic inequality and simple social justice. It was naive to expect that reform could occur by legal means ‘where the social and economic structure are frozen because of the power of the mandarins. . . .’

“ ‘What we are dealing with then,’ he wrote to McNaughton and Bundy, is ‘social revolution by illegal means, infected by the cancer of Communism. I have been told by people in our government that there is no time to reform South Vietnam.

We must win the war first, and then we can get on with the problem of social reform. You may have had something like this in mind yourself when you were talking about the “time fuses” today. I believed this too, until after the third or fourth trip to Vietnam. But the problems are not separable. The Viet Cong know this. It is why they are winning. To the extent we manage our economic assistance, our military action, and our political advice so as to perpetuate a social and economic structure which gave rise to the very problem we are fighting, we will fail to solve that problem’ ” (p. 280).

Bundy addressed this root issue of economic injustice only once, and cynically at that. As a “liberal free-market social welfare advocate,” i.e., an oligarch, he instinctively opposed all development of industry or infrastructure. He was the enemy of anything that even smelled of Roosevelt’s New Deal. But, in 1965, with domestic opposition to the war mounting, President Johnson began searching for a way to placate his liberal critics. He turned to Bundy for an initiative that could win them over.

Bundy decided to call for a large infrastructure development project for Vietnam that would be modelled on the New Deal’s Tennessee Valley Authority. This would appeal to the critics and give pause to the North Vietnamese, or so he hoped. He never intended to actually carry through on the project for the people of Vietnam.

On April 7, 1965, President Johnson delivered a speech in Baltimore drafted by Bundy which called for the creation of a Southeast Asia Development Corporation and a Mekong Valley Authority which would pump billions of dollars of aid into the region. Bird characterized Johnson’s initiative:

“Once the war was settled, North Vietnam would be invited to participate in this extension of the Great Society to Vietnam. He specifically proposed funding a major dam project for the Mekong Valley— ‘bigger and more imaginative than TVA; and a lot tougher to do’ ” (p. 315).

For Bundy, the sole purpose of floating such a development perspective was to buy time for the prosecution of the war, and appease liberal critics. In fact, only this economic development approach, had it been seriously implemented, could have ended the conflict peacefully. It would have superseded de Gaulle’s more limited vision of a neutralist group of nations. However, this approach contradicted Bundy’s British-modelled imperialist outlook and was never pursued; and so, the conflict escalated to its tragic conclusion.

De Gaulle, China, and geopolitics

Once the phony “infrastructure development” policy was dropped, there remained only two directions for U.S. policy in Vietnam in 1965: the British-sponsored, Bundy-crafted escalation, or the policy of de Gaulle, who called for an entente with Russia and China and “neutralist” governments in Indochina.

McGeorge Bundy at the National Security Council, and his brother William, by 1965 Assistant Secretary of State and the action officer on Vietnam, both viewed China as the main

enemy in the region. They despised de Gaulle, and believed his policy as wrecking U.S. foreign policy in Europe and Asia: De Gaulle threatened, as the Bundys saw it, to end the British geopolitical “divide and rule” doctrine that had pitted the United States against its World War II allies Russia and China.

Bird accurately characterizes William Bundy’s approach toward China in 1966: “Townsend Hoopes, who then had Bill’s old job as deputy assistant secretary of defense under John McNaughton, later wrote, ‘Bundy’s real convictions about the war remained to the end a carefully guarded enigma, but in the manner of a professional public servant he lent his considerable diplomatic and legal skills to the support and advocacy of the Rusk position.’ Rusk was obsessed with the lessons he had learned from the last war—Korea. He saw China as the ultimate strategic enemy, and in his view American troops in Vietnam were actually containing Chinese expansionism. His single greatest fear was that the Chinese might repeat their performance in Korea and suddenly dispatch hundreds of thousands of troops to fight alongside the North Vietnamese. The State Department’s leading China expert, Allen Whiting, repeatedly warned his colleagues that the Chinese were getting into the war” (p. 354).

Thus, all political weapons were aimed at de Gaulle, the chief proponent of a policy of entente with the Chinese and the sponsor of neutral governments throughout Southeast Asia, to end the grip of both the Cold War and British colonialism.

In late August 1963, one month before the Bundy coup toppled Diem, the neutralist alternative was a live option. De Gaulle invited all parties to the conflict, both the North and the South Vietnamese, to a peace conference in Paris, to “negotiate the reunification of Vietnam on the basis of a government of national unity and neutralism. If Kennedy had wanted it, the French President was offering the perfect vehicle for a graceful and honorable withdrawal. But Mac Bundy regarded de Gaulle’s proposal as an interference, a bald attempt by the French President to reinsinuate French influence over a former colony. In a memo to the President, Mac observed ‘. . . that we do best when we ignore Nosey Charlie.’ Bill Bundy called the proposal ‘impractical if not mischievous’ ” (p. 256).

In the spring of 1964, establishment insider and Washington columnist Walter Lippmann visited de Gaulle in Paris and returned with yet another overture for peace based on a neutralist formula. This time de Gaulle’s proposal had the backing of Sen. Mike Mansfield and administration confidant John Kenneth Galbraith.

Again Bundy killed the proposal, and gave Lippmann a dose of the Bundy vitriol.

The ‘Wise Men’

Bundy was not speaking only for himself. Escalation in Vietnam was the hardened outlook of the most Anglophile Cold Warriors in the establishment, ironically dubbed the “Wise Men.” These were the protégés and sycophants of Teddy Roosevelt and Henry Stimson, i.e., the leaders of the American faction of the BAC power elite, who included John

J. McCloy, Dean Acheson, and Robert Lovett.

It was during this fight to kill any Franco-American cooperation, that McGeorge Bundy emerged as their leader. On July 8, 1965, Bundy convened a meeting of these men with President Johnson to bolster the case for further escalation in Vietnam. Johnson had been wavering, but, after a string of heavily weighted briefings, Bundy carried the day with the President. The cabal urged a massive increase in U.S. troop commitment in Vietnam. One crucial reason: to stop de Gaulle!

The key player in the sessions was Bundy’s in-law Dean Acheson,⁷ the staunchest proponent of British interests. After a long day of complaints from Johnson about the lack of support for his war, Bird reports that Acheson exploded:

“I blew my top and told him he [Johnson] was wholly right on Vietnam, that he had no choice except to press on, that explanations were not as important as successful action.’ This scolding emboldened the others in the room to join in. ‘With this lead my colleagues came thundering in like the charge of the Scots Greys at Waterloo. They were fine; Bob Lovett, usually cautious, was all out. . . . I think . . . we scored.’ Indeed, the next day, Mac Bundy reported to his aides, ‘The moustache [Acheson, whose trademark was the British General Kitchener mustache] was voluble’ ” (p. 338).

Bird continues, “Bill Bundy’s notes from one of the [Wise Men] meetings summed up the consensus. If Vietnam was lost to the communists, ‘De Gaulle would find many takers for his argument that the U.S. could not now be counted on to defend Europe.’ The war in Vietnam, in other words, was all about NATO’s credibility in Europe” (p. 338).

Any South Vietnamese leader who dared support the de Gaulle approach was summarily killed and his government overthrown. There would be no escape from the Bundy brothers’ prosecution of the war, which was modelled on any British operation: step function escalation, removal of all opposition, meatgrinder campaigns. As McGeorge Bundy said in 1965, he “would rather maintain our present commitment and ‘waffle through’ than withdraw. The country [United States] is in the mood to accept grim news” (p. 339).

Bundy spelled out his Churchillian outlook in a memo drafted two weeks before his departure from the White House. Bird describes how, in it he took issue with the Lippmann

7. The key player orchestrating the United States entry into the Indochina imbroglio was Dean Acheson, President Truman’s Secretary of State and the most overt Anglophile in U.S. State Department policymaking circles in the 1950s and ’60s. Acheson was the son of a British Army officer, who became an Anglican priest and was later bishop of Connecticut. Truman was repeatedly manipulated by Acheson, who drew up what became known as the Truman Doctrine to halt the “spread of communism” in Europe—under the aegis of Churchill’s Cold War. It was Acheson who drew the line, nominally against communism, but in fact in defense of British-French colonialism in Southeast Asia. In 1949, Secretary of State Acheson met with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on Indochina. Nehru urged Acheson to support Vietnamese nationalist Ho Chi Minh, who had been sympathetic to the United States during World War II. Acheson rejected Nehru’s advice and threw U.S. support behind French puppet Bao Dai.



These pictures, printed in The Color of Truth, show William Bundy confronted by anti-war protesters—a movement which was funded by McGeorge Bundy at the Ford Foundation—in Philadelphia in 1971 (left), and a demonstration against McGeorge Bundy’s plans to decentralize New York City schools. Lyndon LaRouche denounced McGeorge Bundy’s social engineering at that time, in a pamphlet entitled “The New Left, Local Control, and Fascism.”



thesis: “Contrary to Lippmann’s assumption that the United States didn’t belong in Southeast Asia, Bundy noted that ‘we have been the dominant power’ there for twenty years. ‘The truth is that in Southeast Asia we are stronger than China.’ The war’s casualties were terrible, but the ‘danger to one man’s life, as such, is not a worthy guide. . . . If the basic questions of interest, right, and power are answered, the casualties and costs are to be accepted’ ” (pp. 346-47).

However, in the same way that Bundy and company bullied Lyndon Johnson to go deeper into the quagmire, it was Bundy who made the turn toward withdrawal, with the same cabal in tow, three years later.

On March 20, 1968, the Wise Men met for the last time with Johnson, this time to alter course; not to leave Vietnam, but to shift toward increasing “Vietnamization” of the war. The entire conference was orchestrated by the Bundy brothers. Well in advance of the meeting, Bill Bundy brought each of the three “briefers,” who had been carefully selected to bamboozle the assembled VIPs, over to his father-in-law’s house in Georgetown, where they spent hours choreographing the whole affair.

The meeting itself was mere formality. Acheson, Clark Clifford (Bill Bundy’s old boss and confidant), and McGeorge Bundy ran roughshod over the beleaguered President, forcing him to back off from the war and decide not to seek reelection.

The stage was now set for a drastic turn, but this time in domestic policy: the introduction of a new cultural outlook,

something more insidious and more venal than even the war in Indochina. And again, McGeorge Bundy would be in the forefront.

Bundy, the Ford Foundation, and the New Left

As destructive as McGeorge Bundy was in the White House, his tenure at the Ford Foundation was even more corrosive.

Bundy was recruited to replace John J. McCloy as chairman of the Ford Foundation by McCloy himself. At the time, McCloy was the leader of the BAC oligarchs in the United States. Bundy’s deployment into the Foundation signalled his ascendancy in the BAC as well as the importance placed on the role of the Ford Foundation. This was the richest and most influential domestic institution of its type, and Bundy would remain in place for 13 years. In the process, he ushered in the New Age philosophy, whose influence has almost obliterated any memory the nation has left of its founding purpose.

The progressive, enervating shocks of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the assassination of the President, and the protracted conflict in Vietnam had devastated the psychological makeup of both the Baby-Boomer generation and their parents. The moment was ripe for Bundy’s new project: a cultural paradigm-shift whose purpose was to wreck America’s self-con-

ception. The nation would be transformed from one which believed in the principles of the sacredness of human life, the primacy of scientific and technological progress, and cultural optimism, into a degenerate adjunct of the decaying British Empire, which recast itself as the Commonwealth. The United States was to be fully assimilated into the BAC, and the Ford Foundation would play a central role.

In the 1970s, Rep. Wright Patman (D-Tex.), speaking from the floor of the House, charged that “the Ford Foundation [had] a grandiose design to bring vast political, economic, and social changes to the nation in the 1970s” (p. 386). Bundy replied to the charges, “Philanthropy is a very hard business. . . . It’s easy to give away pretty buildings to a nice place. But our social system needs a lot of change, a lot of renewal, which is our problem too, and that’s much harder” (p. 391).

Writes Bird: “As president of the Ford Foundation, Bundy had been promised that he could be his own boss. Charlie Wyzanski [a Warburg who tapped Bundy], McCloy, and other trustees had assured him that he would have the freedom to make mistakes. ‘They were eager for new ideas,’ Bundy said. ‘There was no unwillingness — as a conscious desire — to move into the hot firing line.’ And that’s what Bundy was eager to do. ‘He will be,’ remarked one Ford trustee a bit nervously, ‘a very stimulating influence’ ” (p. 377).

Bundy spent more than \$25 million in his 13-year tenure

at Ford, funding every “New Age,” radical environmentalist, zero-growth outfit to come down the pike. Bundy took a sledge hammer to our national identity. “Social engineering” was his clarion call.

Bundy’s first project was the creation of a public broadcasting network for television. Promoted as an alternative to the commercial networks, the Ford Foundation gave hundreds of millions of dollars over ten years to create the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, which funds the Public Broadcasting System (PBS). Bundy modelled it on the British Broadcasting Corp., and PBS became the vehicle for the invasion of decadent British “culture” into the United States.

We can thank McGeorge Bundy for the tasteless British sit-coms and fawning portrayals of the British aristocracy that inundate our airwaves, the “highbrow” alternative to the pop-cult decadence spewed out over the four commercial networks. PBS has also served to overwhelm the nation with British environmentalist propaganda.

The curious case of Isaiah Berlin

One of the earliest projects sponsored by Ford, and steered through personally by Bundy, involved the funding of an entire college at Oxford University in England.

One of Bundy’s first grants at Ford reflected his relationship with British pseudo-philosopher and intelligence agent Isaiah Berlin. In 1966, Bundy sponsored one of the largest grants of his tenure, \$4.5 million, to endow Wolfson College, a new branch of Oxford University. He did this on behalf of Berlin, a longtime associate dating back to at least Bundy’s days as Harvard dean.

The deal was brokered by a Bundy intimate, columnist Joseph Alsop, and was finally closed by an intervention of British Prime Minister Harold Wilson. Berlin had collaborated with Bundy and Alsop on and off for years, and was a participant at seminars convened during the Kennedy administration at Robert Kennedy’s home.

During the Vietnam War, Berlin, Alsop, Charles “Chip” Bohlen, and Bundy formed the core of the most adamant war hawks around President Johnson.

However, Berlin had a deeper history in British policy-making, and especially in intelligence circles. As the son of well-to-do Russian immigrants to England, Berlin was picked up while an Oxford undergraduate by the Rothschild family. In 1939, while lecturing at Oxford, Berlin was recruited by “Soviet spy,” British triple-agent Guy Burgess. Berlin was assigned to America and spent the entirety of the war at the British Embassy, spying on Americans. His job was to profile American anti-British sentiments and intervene to change them. His reports went directly to Churchill, and he was deployed throughout the United States to convince Americans of the intrinsic goodness of our erstwhile enemies, the British. Berlin went to union meetings and Jewish-American meetings to ply his goods, and sent back voluminous reports on everything he observed.

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Following the war, he was courted by Lord Beaverbrook and British spy chief Arnold Toynbee for a career in Her Majesty's secret services. Berlin purportedly rejected the offers and chose a career in academia, along with informal participation in policymaking. He also ghost-wrote sections of Churchill's history of the British Empire.

In the 1950s, he was deployed to Harvard where he hooked up with Bundy and his circle. He periodically contributed articles to *Foreign Affairs*, the magazine of the New York Council on Foreign Relations, and authored short profiles on a variety of historical figures.

Thus, it was only natural that Berlin would turn to Bundy, his American counterpart in the BAC circles, to fund the new extension of British cultural warfare at Oxford.

Cultural paradigm-shift

All the Bundy projects at the Ford Foundation targetted the most deeply held principles of American life. Where Americans naturally supported large families, scientific and technological progress, and a rising standard of living, Bundy introduced radical Malthusian ideology into the culture. He provided substantial initial funding for the Population Council, which advocated radical population reduction and genocide in the underdeveloped nations.

He underwrote the attack on industry, launched by the nascent environmentalist movement. This included a \$400,000 grant to the Natural Resources Defense Council, to sue the Environmental Protection Agency for failing to enforce auto emission standards.

Bundy spawned the array of environmentalist and "public interest" legal outfits, including the Environmental Defense Fund and the Sierra Club Defense Fund.

The Ford Foundation became the leading financier of the British colonial counterinsurgency method, euphemistically called "community control."

The Ford Foundation's specific initiatives included bankrolling radical Black Power counter-operations to the Martin Luther King, Jr.-led civil rights movement, and it initiated the "local community control" operations to divert attention from the radical shift in the economy, out of industry and into what was later called the "post-industrial society" and "controlled disintegration."

At the height of Dr. King's civil rights efforts, Bundy dropped millions of dollars into the Congress of Racial Equality and other Black Power organizations, to break the power of King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Explains Bird: "Bundy was saying as explicitly as he could that there was room in America for black nationalism and indeed black power. The Ford Foundation would lend its resources to 'attacking' white prejudice wherever it was found. As to black power, Bundy promised, with a note of defiance, that 'the Ford Foundation will work with Negro leaders of good will and peaceful purpose without any anguished measurement of their position on the issue of a separated power of blackness

as against the continuing claim to integration' " (p. 382).

Bundy's Ford Foundation bankrolled degenerates such as beat poet Leroy Jones, who changed his name to Imamu Bakara and formed a Black Nationalist gang that imposed a reign of street terror on Newark, New Jersey, after that city's economy had already been decimated by the 1967 riots.

During the spring 1968 student strike at Columbia University, Bundy and the Ford Foundation secretly bankrolled the launching of the Weathermen terrorist organization. Ford financed a community group, the East Side Service Organization, headed by Tom Neumann, the nephew of Frankfurt School New Left ideologue Herbert Marcuse. Neumann passed those funds on to Weathermen leaders Mark Rudd and Bernadine Dohrn, who turned the Columbia strike into a mini-riot.

The Weathermen/Ford Foundation story does not appear in Bird's book. But, the Columbia incident marked the beginning of a 30-year battle between the Bundys and Lyndon LaRouche, who, in 1967, had already written a devastating exposé of Bundy's filthy Ford Foundation operations, titled "The New Left, Local Control, and Fascism."

Perhaps the most important experiment launched by Ford, and controlled personally by Bundy, was the destruction of public education in New York City. In the fall of 1966, Bundy chaired a city-wide panel on school decentralization, and he used this panel to impose a Vietnam-style "strategic hamlet" policy on the city. Using the Ford Foundation, Bundy directed \$334,000 into the Ocean Hill-Brownsville community school board. The board fired 19 teachers and the union responded with a prolonged city-wide strike that ripped apart the historic Black-Jewish alliance which had been key in the success of the civil rights movement.

This was also a direct assault on one of the most important unions in the country, and, at one blow, paved the way for the systematic destruction of organized labor and public education over the next three decades.

By the time Bundy retired from the Ford Foundation at the end of the 1970s, the United States was well on its way to becoming a post-industrial scrapheap, dominated by British geopolitical thinking at the top, and New Age lunacy in every pore of society. Bundy's Vietnam War had destroyed the American military; the anti-war movement he bankrolled via the Ford Foundation had spawned a drug-rock-sex counter-culture that has become the dominant culture of the nation. William Bundy had taken charge of *Foreign Affairs*, where he promoted the BAC agenda for the 1980s: "the controlled disintegration of the world economy," as part of its "1980s Project."

Bundy protégés, including Kissinger, Brzezinski, and Huntington, still stalk the corridors of power, peddling their policies of destruction. It's time for this poison to be purged from the American body politic. And to the extent that Kai Bird sheds light on the true Bundy legacy, his book serves a useful purpose.