

special security program, named “Operation Surety,” to go into effect, beginning September 9, 1999. This operation is designed to anticipate a deadly social crisis’s eruption under the conditions of the world financial meltdown expected for the interval between September 9, 1999 and the close of the year. No one I know—and I do have many high-level sources in various parts of the world—can give me a definite date, other than “soon, perhaps next week, perhaps October,” for the expected date of the chain-reaction collapse of the world’s financial system. However, that kind of collapse, of a kind far worse than October 1929, is already onrushing; it is not something which could happen; it is something which, in fact, is already happening.

The intervention of the effects of this world financial collapse into the present strategic situation, automatically and immediately changes all of the determining parameters of the worldwide strategic situation. No existing government could last long enough to carry out a pro-warfare posture effectively under such circumstances.

Notable is the situation in Russia itself. Whatever else may happen there, and there are many possibilities, virtually all extremely dramatic ones, the present situation in Russia is not to be expected to last past the end of September, if that long.

Were I President of the U.S.A., I would know how to deal with this mess. Given the very advanced state of sundry presently ongoing world crises, I could not guarantee success, but I am the only figure who might have a chance of success.

The Kursk Was Target of NATO

by Paul Gallagher

All Russian military and other official accounts of the destruction of the *Kursk* and its crew, have converged on the hypothesis that the submarine, while engaged in the Russian all-ocean naval maneuvers, collided with a foreign submarine. At least three NATO submarines, two American and one British, are known to have been conducting general surveillance of the part of the Russian maneuvers taking place in the Barents Sea; but that is not the whole story. The *Kursk*, an attack submarine of the class known as “Oscar II,” was an object of special NATO attention.

During the Cold War, United States submarines enjoyed for 30 years the advantage of being quieter than their Soviet counterparts. Using this advantage, U.S. submarines routinely followed Soviet subs—in particular, Soviet subs which could launch ballistic nuclear missiles—for months at a time without being detected. Their purpose was to eliminate, as far as possible, the Soviet capability to use their major subma-

rines in time of war, either to launch a retaliatory nuclear “second strike,” or to stop U.S. carrier battle groups from attacking. The U.S. attack, or “hunter” submarines would pick up their Soviet surveillance “targets” coming out of the Barents Sea, by the time the Soviet subs entered the North Atlantic through the so-called “Greenland-U.K. Gap.”

In the course of this surveillance and stalking over decades, collisions occurred which were never officially acknowledged.

But during the Cold War, the rule of engagement for the U.S. submarine captains so engaged, was to break off pursuit and lose the Soviet sub, rather than let the surveillance be known by the Soviet side.

The Soviet Navy had much more difficulty employing this tactic, both because American submarines launch from Norfolk, Virginia or San Diego, California directly into deep and open ocean, and because the Soviet subs were noisier. But by 1990, this had changed: For example, Russian Commander of the Northern Fleet Oleg Yerofeyev stated on June 3, 1992: “In the end of last year and the beginning of this year we performed a search exercise with flying colors. For five days our new submarine was following [an] American strategic submarine and [this] was interrupted only by the order of General Staff. In other words, the Americans were unable to escape from us. Even this simple fact speaks volumes.”

Soviet Collapse

It is known, that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, this U.S. and NATO tactic, of attempting almost constantly to follow all major Russian submarines, continued without let-up. This military tactic continued in a new context: the Soviet Union had collapsed; the Russian economy was being looted systematically by Western financial interests and their junior-partner Russian “oligarchs”; Russia’s devastated economy had collapsed the Russian defense budget to the equivalent of \$5-10 billion annually. And as the global financial crisis worsened, NATO launched more and more direct strategic provocations toward Russia, seeking to humiliate and eliminate it as a superpower.

Yet the Russian nuclear navy introduced the new “Oscar II” attack submarines, including the *Kursk* in 1995, which caused consternation in NATO circles. The *Kursk* was one of the most advanced and robust attack subs in the world, extremely quiet, with the firepower potentially to destroy half an entire carrier battle group, and with two nuclear engines, to keep fighting if one were disabled. The U.S. “Seawolf” class attack submarine was developed during the 1990s specifically to try to regain the advantage in quietness, which had been lost to the likes of the *Kursk*.

Thus, in August, the *Kursk*, participating in Russian Navy all-ocean maneuvers which had been suspended for eight years, and which would see it break into the Atlantic and then enter the Mediterranean, would have been a particular target of submarine surveillance.

But more: NATO was seeking to humiliate these particu-

lar maneuvers and force Russia to abandon them for the future: The poison-pen column of Hoagland in the *Wall Street Journal*, and a *Washington Post* editorial (see *Documentation*), make this clear. The Cold War rule of engagement for this submarine surveillance may have changed, dramatically, in the current period, contributing to the danger of war. If U.S.,

British, and other NATO subs were ordered to *provocatively* follow the *Kursk* and other major Russian submarines, in order to “send the signal” that these maneuvers were a waste of Russian resources, as the Western columnists were claiming, then the likelihood of unintentional collision with one of the targetted submarines, will have become far greater.

FIGURE 1
Area of Operations for the Russian Northern Fleet

