

What, in fact, is a constitutionally tolerable concept of warfare for the United States? As Lyndon LaRouche has repeatedly reminded, in the republic military tradition, “The mission of war is peace.” The only legitimate reason for going to war is to secure the conditions for a durable peace, just as MacArthur had oriented his strategy not only for his conduct of the war in the Pacific, but also his post-war occupation of Japan.

Such a strategic outlook cannot be served by Cheney’s imperial war policy, but rather, only by the application of strategic defense. LaRouche described MacArthur’s conduct of the war in the Pacific as “the most brilliant case-history of the military-strategic applications of the principles of strategic defense in my lifetime.”

LaRouche further emphasized that the only constitutionally tolerable military policy of the United States “is the adoption of the overall-ruling, long mission of fostering the bringing into being of a global community of principle among sovereign nation-states.” Corollary to this is the principle of the flank, which “expresses . . . the ability of the individual human mind to discover and employ efficiently a newly discovered, or neglected universal principle, of physical science or Classical artistic culture.”

The natural advantage of the individual human mind is the source of technology, and MacArthur was able to absorb that advantage into his grand strategic outlook of winning the peace. This is the difference between “strategic defense,” and Cheney’s and Rumsfeld’s transformation of the military for a world of perpetual war.

## A Note on Principles Of Strategic Defense

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

Formally, the concept of strategic defense dates from Lazare Carnot’s paper known as the “Homage to Vauban.” This was developed from that point on by Carnot; and by the Gerhard Scharnhorst who was a graduate of Moses Mendelssohn’s program for training of candidate officers and a student of the example of Carnot’s leadership; and by the related work of the *École Polytechnique* (e.g., Chaptal, et al.), in French military affairs during 1792-94. In U.S. post-1814 military history, this tradition was fused with the lessons of the American experience in the colonies, and during the Revolutionary War. Thence, West Point represented two conflicting traditions: the one incorporating the lessons of the Carnot-Scharnhorst tradition; the opposite, that of Bernard Jomini, the Swiss mercenary general.

Jomini’s influence in the U.S.A. is ironical, to say the

least. It is exemplified by that section of West Point graduates associated with President Polk’s war with Mexico, which supplied the core of the military organization for the Confederacy. With a deeper probing of that aspect of our national history, the stink grows worse; the Confederacy’s adopted tradition of the Swiss mercenary Jomini, reflects Jomini’s association with and against Napoleon Bonaparte. Jomini is an expression of the Martinist/Synarchist freemasonic cult which conducted the French Revolution of July 14, 1789 through 1815; of Napoleon III; of Spanish Carlism; all the way through such creatures as Mussolini, Hitler, Franco, et al., and the U.S. and Israeli neo-conservatives of today. The Confederacy was a fascist dictatorship; it was the ideology of Napoleon Bonaparte’s family and veterans in the U.S.A., and the coincident influence of Murat, all of which played a crucial direct role as participation in both the Confederacy and the filibustering operations preceding it.

Lincoln’s mobilization for war is a reflection of the principles of strategic defense. General MacArthur’s direction of the war in the Pacific is—apart from errors which had a contrary direction, such as the unnecessary assault on Iwo Jima—the most brilliant case-history of the military-strategic applications of the principles of strategic defense during my lifetime.

The concept of strategic defense took root in France in the roles of Cardinal Mazarin and Jean-Baptiste Colbert; in Mazarin’s leading role in bringing about the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia; and Colbert’s opposition, as a great economic nation-builder, to the Fronde-ist follies of that virtual Mithra-cultist “Sun King” Louis XIV, who prefigured the imperial tyranny of Bonaparte.

Vauban was notable for Monge’s pupil Carnot as an example of the method of strategic defense applied successfully by Vauban during the wars of Louis XIV. I have walked through the fortress city of Neuf Breisach; for the technology of artillery in use during the early Eighteenth Century, the city, still intact and functioning, was an exemplary work of genius in application of strategic defense. Those two Vauban fortresses in Southeastern France prevented the Austrian penetration of France during that time, and supplied the most formidable resistance to the Prussian-German forces during the Franco-Prussian War. The Maginot Line, as originally conceived—but misused by the foolish French command later—was a reflection of the exemplary work on strategic defense of Vauban and Carnot.

### Republican Military Policy Today

Now, with the advent of nuclear and comparable technology, the conception of warfare should have undergone a revolutionary change from that of modern history until 1940-42 (e.g., Stalingrad). World War II was fought and won, in both Europe and the Pacific, by the Anglo-American-Soviet allies through application of the kind of strategic defense expressed by the successfully applied design, by von Wolzo-



The principle of strategic defense begins for modern, extended European civilization, with the actions of France's Cardinal Mazarin (above) and Jean-Baptiste Colbert, in finally ending the Thirty Years' War, and basing their policy toward other nations on the principle of the "advantage of the other." LaRouche states this idea as John Quincy Adams did, a "community of principle."

gen, for using Napoleon's invasion of Russia as a trap to destroy him; a design which von Wolzogen premised chiefly on Friedrich Schiller's studies in depth of the Netherlands and Thirty Years' Wars. Now, we must develop strategies which are a continuation of the essential principle of strategic defense, but are suited to the era of nuclear and related technologies.

The only constitutionally tolerable conception of the military policy of the U.S.A., today, as during 1776-1789, is the adoption of the overall-ruling, long mission of fostering the bringing into being of a global community of principle among of sovereign nation-states, not only within the Americas, but the world at large. John Quincy Adams' draft of the Monroe Doctrine, and Lincoln's Gettysburg Address — which should be the code of dedication for cadets and graduates of West Point and Annapolis — are more or less succinct expressions of the original intention of what is fairly called "The Benjamin Franklin" project of the 1763-89 interval: To create here, a new nation, to become, in the words of Lafayette, a temple of liberty and beacon of hope for all mankind.

Thus, for U.S. patriots, the mission of war is peace, whereas for the Synarchists and their like, the mission of war is world-rule through war. Our preliminary mission is to establish a successful peace; our long-term mission is to establish a durable peace among sovereign nation-states; our ultimate mission is to establish a community of principle among sovereign nation-states.

### Auftragstaktik

The correlated feature of such a mission-orientation of strategic defense, is the principle of the strategic flank. For example, Frederick the Great at Leuthen, outflanking and routing a greatly superior Austrian force, twice in the same day. Essentially, the principle of the flank expresses the use of the natural advantage of the human individual over all beasts, including those, such as our own and Israel's neo-conservatives, whose behavior is that of beasts. The typification of that principle of the flank is the ability of the individual human mind to discover and employ efficiently a newly discovered, or neglected universal principle, of physical science or Classical artistic culture. The application of this is expressed at the level of the smallest military or comparable unit, by what Scharnhorst's tradition defined as Auftragstaktik [mission orientation].

I wish to build that tradition deep into a reform of the military training of both regular military forces, and reserves developed and maintained through restoration of universal military training, or UMT. (UMT, properly designed, will cost us a net nothing; the gains in productivity implicit in such training, according to that principle, will more than offset the costs incurred, and also make for a better quality of citizen.)

"Exit strategy" is a vulgarization, albeit a presently useful improvisation, for the notion of strategic-defense war conducted as the means for building a more-or-less durable peace.