

EIR Book Review

Empire for Democratic Dummies, Soros-Style

by Stuart Rosenblatt

The Dust of Empire

by Karl E. Meyer

New York: Century Foundation, 2003
237 pages, hardbound, \$26

This book sells itself as a guide for confused Americans trying to figure out what United States policy is all about in Central Asia, and looking for some history of the region in which the “war against terrorism” is being contested. But in reality, *The Dust of Empire* is a thinly-veiled call for the creation of a liberal imperial world order modelled on the less disgusting aspects of the British Empire of the 19th Century. While claiming, quite falsely, to rest upon centuries of change in America’s role in the world, the book rests in fact on a “coup d’état” in American policy and government which is only three years old.

“Clearly limned on the post-9/11 screen,” writes Meyer, “is a reality that many Americans are reluctant to face or acknowledge. Like it or not, Washington is the seat of an empire, whose awesome economic power has given it an unparalleled global reach. True enough, America is not an empire in a formal sense; our official creed is republican and our schoolbooks celebrate our anti-colonial origins. . . .”

Meyer is no neophyte to the policy establishment. He currently sits on the editorial board of the *New York Times*, is the editor of the *World Policy Journal*, and is a former foreign correspondent for the *Washington Post*. His book was sponsored by the Century Foundation, a “liberal” policy group associated with billionaire financier George Soros, which was also involved in the recent launching of the Soros-funded

Center for Progress in America. The board of directors of the Century Foundation includes John Podesta, the Soros ally who runs this Center, by which the mega-speculator is seeking to buy and take over the Democratic Party.

Publication of this book now reflects the ongoing faction fight in Synarchist political circles, between the neo-conservative grouping around madmen such as Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, and their ilk, who advocate “preventive nuclear war,” and the more Liberal-Imperialist tendency by which Soros, his pet Presidential candidate Gen. Wesley Clark (ret.), Zbigniew Brzezinski, the New York Council on Foreign Relations, and others *also* support a U.S. imperial domination and looting of most nations in the world, but by other methods. This book represents, financially as well as literarily, the U.S. imperialism of Soros, Clark, et al. Meyer’s “model” to reform the disasters of Afghanistan and Iraq, is the bungled intervention in the Balkans conflict under NATO Commander Wesley Clark.

The False Axiomatics of Empire

While purporting to offer a historical perspective that can successfully guide U.S. policy in Central Asia, Meyer instead starts from a set of false assumptions, and reasons to conclusions that would land the United States squarely in the imperial camp. While condemning historical illiteracy as a disease common to Americans, Meyer exposes his own historical blindspots.

He begins the book with the false assertion that the United States itself is an empire, and has been an empire for well over one hundred years. This brazenly lying statement has been echoed repeatedly in the pages of *Foreign Affairs* magazine, starting with an article by Sebastian Mallaby prior to the Iraq war, and continuing in the recent several issues of that

publication; it is espoused by many “scholars” in many other so-called liberal imperial publications. Meyer, for example, quotes both historical Ronald Steele (*Pax Americana*, 1967) and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. to the effect that Americans should see themselves as rulers of an empire, and adds, “Americans tend to resent these simple truths being uttered.”

Meyer insists that we inherit the mantle of the fallen British Empire. He enthuses on what he says is the might of the American-dominated English-speaking world in economic and military terms, and claims that all of this emerged from the 20th-Century demise of the British Empire. “In a real sense, America now sits where Britain did in the 1890’s, only the old empire is squared. Even at her apogee, Britannia had nothing like America’s economic and military preponderance. . . . The thesis of this book is that the moral and diplomatic dilemmas confronting Washington today differ in degree but not in kind from those that confronted Britain before World War I.”

However, conveniently skips over the mass of evidence disproving his thesis. He omits virtually all reference to the republican and sovereign origins and tradition of the United States. He fails to mention John Quincy Adams’ Monroe Doctrine, Lincoln’s heroic war against the British Empire (American Civil War), Franklin Roosevelt’s waging of World War II against the Synarchist beast-men Hitler, Mussolini, Tojo, et al., and also FDR’s polemical denunciations of Churchill’s post-war imperial plans. Likewise, Meyer neglects to mention Eisenhower’s denunciation of the Israelis and the British in the Suez Crisis, or John F. Kennedy’s moves to disengage the United States from the Indochina war.

Hatred of the Nation-State

Meyer’s second major false premise is his equation of nations with empires. In this assertion he proves to be a pathetically ill-informed enemy of the sovereign nation-state republic. With barely concealed rage, he despises the origins and history of the United States. He spends a bit of time rhapsodizing about the origin of the British Empire as a great nation—though his praise is for the Empire—and then he launches into ridiculous characterizations of the United States and its mission:

“What took centuries on the British Isles happened figuratively overnight in the New World. On June 7, 1776, the Continental Congress resolved that ‘these United Colonies’



ought to be free and independent. On July 4, less than a month later, Jefferson’s pen magically changed the name to ‘the Thirteen United States of America.’ Not long after the Treaty of Paris formally ended hostilities in 1783, Americans had contrived the half-mythical ingredients of nationhood: Old Glory, ‘Yankee Doodle,’ Paul Revere’s ride, Valley Forge, Betsy Ross, the Boston Tea Party, Nathan Hale, and Washington crossing the Delaware. By 1800 the consolidation of American national identity was complete. What made this possible was an exceptional skein of circumstances—a gifted generation of rebels, British preoccupation with France, the swift adoption of an elastic Federal system, and George Washington’s decision to retire after two terms as president, thereby sparing Americans a senescent liberator-for-life.”

Meyer quickly follows this diatribe against the principles of the Founding Fathers, as embedded in the Preamble to the Constitution, with denial of the existence of higher ideas in human history. He gives a wild reductionist/bestial characterization of nations as combinations of four common attributes—ethnicity, language, territory, and religion—but then admits that these markings inevitably break down. He resorts to symbols, such as recognized items like flags, but tosses that out as too flimsy; and then turns to appeals to hatreds,

prejudices, primal lusts, common enemies as ways to unite a people.

At no point does he ever pose the more crucial issue, as does Presidential candidate Lyndon LaRouche, of the distinction between man and beast, and the origin of the modern nation-state as a unique creative innovation during the Golden Renaissance.

The entire book is dominated by his antagonism to the principle of the nation-state and his fascination with empire, which causes him to continually mis-estimate both the history of Central Asia and the implications for current policy-making.

Eurasia, for Example

Among the higher ideals of humanity whose existence Meyer absolutely denies, is the idea of Eurasian development—the new, Vernadskian “Silk Road” that LaRouche has discussed. For example, in his analysis of the history of Russia, the crucial nation in Central Asia, Meyer has no problem evaluating the autocratic tradition inside of the country and the history of expansionism that spanned the era of the tsars and the soviets. However, an understanding of the great scientific and artistic accomplishments of Russia, and their connection to the Renaissance and Republican movements in Europe, is nowhere to be found. There is virtually no compre-

hension of the influence of Leibniz or Pushkin on the national character, no appreciation of the great scientific achievements of Mendeleev or Vernadsky, and nothing of the profound collaborations of Lincoln, FDR, and other American leaders with the Russian government.

Hence, when he tries to evaluate the current thrust of Russia, he fixates on the prospects for exploiting the vast oil reserves—a typical fascination of imperialists—but misses the immense new arrangements being orchestrated by LaRouche and the governments of India and China to construct a durable peace based on the Eurasian Land-Bridge concept. Meyer foolishly cites Dmitri Trenin, the author of *The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization*, as the best source for the answer to the age-old question, “Whither Russia?” “Russia-Eurasia is over. To the west of its borders, there lies an increasingly unified Europe, a natural place for Russia’s own integration as a European country in an appropriate form. To the east lies an increasingly interconnected Asia, where Russia must either establish itself as a country in Asia or face the mounting pressure to withdraw west of the Urals. . . . Yet the end of Eurasia, a real catastrophe, is no tragedy. It is merely the end of a long era. But it is not the end of Russia, for which a new and potentially happier era can now start.”

Meyer’s views of Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and other nations in this region have similar shortcomings, and it is no accident that Meyer casually endorses Bernard Lewis’, Samuel Huntington’s, and Brzezinski’s Clash of Civilizations dogma as axiomatic truth. For Meyer, the issue is managing the region more effectively in a globalized world order, not establishing a community of sovereign nations in the tradition of John Quincy Adams.

Multilateralism, New Name for Liberal Imperialism

In the conclusion, Meyer outlines the Liberal Imperialist military agenda. He laces into the unilateralist approach of President Bush and his puppeteer Dick Cheney, though refraining from ever naming the latter. He compares the Splendid Isolationism that brought down the British Empire in the late 19th Century to Bush’s unilateralism today. Because his book was published just prior to the attack on Iraq, Meyer references the unilateralist fiasco in Afghanistan as a developing disaster, and warns of similar consequences were America to invade Iraq without allies. He never decries the intention to overthrow Saddam Hussein, merely the likely form of the intervention: the lack of allies in an imperial endeavor. When analyzing the failure in Afghanistan, Meyer compares the deepening disaster of this “war on terror” to the “great success” achieved by NATO forces in the Balkans War in 1997. His expert analyst is none other than Gen. Wesley Clark, formerly supreme allied commander in Europe, now Presidential candidate: “This is a fundamental misjudgment. The longer this war goes on, and by all accounts it will go on

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for years, the more our success will depend on the willing cooperation and active cooperation of our allies to root out terrorist cells in Europe and Asia, to cut off funding and support of terrorists and to deal with Saddam Hussein and other threats.”

Meyer then goes on to praise the NATO apparatus and recommend it as the intervention vehicle of choice, quoting Clark: “NATO itself acted as a consensus engine for its members. Because it acts on the basis of such broad agreement, every decision is an opportunity for members to dissent—therefore every decision generates pressure to agree. . . . This process evokes leadership from the stronger states and pulls the others along. . . . NATO worked. It held political leaders accountable to their electorate. It made an American-dominated effort essentially their effort. It made American success their success.” General Clark is also his Afghanistan expert: “We could have simply phased this operation and turned over what had begun as a U.S.-only operation to a NATO mission, under U.S. leadership.”

To underscore his point, Meyer then develops a series of scenarios under which a new “multilateral” imperium could be sustained. “What is to be done? If ever a region called out for a multilateral approach, in which America’s presence would be one among many, it is Central Eurasia. If military bases are needed, let them be NATO bases, thereby making good use of an alliance whose nineteen members, for the first time ever in 2001, evoked the one-for-all mutual defense clause in the founding charter. . . . As it happens, five of Central Eurasia’s eight countries have signed up for NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, so that links already exist with the alliance. For Americans, a NATO presence offers a prudent means of securing military facilities in the region, while diluting Washington’s identification with repressive regimes.”

The problem, finally, is axiomatics. At no point does Meyer offer a solution that could work. Rather than embrace a policy similar to that of LaRouche’s Eurasian Land-Bridge—which an erudite geopolitician like Meyer is undoubtedly aware of—he simply proposes a different type of imperialism. In defending his call for a multilateral military force like NATO, to intervene in the Central Asian region, he hearkens back to the memory of an earlier disaster, the Trojan Wars. “This point is as old as the Trojan War. It was the joint appeal of the allied Greek commanders that finally coaxed the sulking Achilles from his tent and back into the field, thereby opening the way to victory in the ten-year war, albeit gained through a covert trick.”

Like his other imperial co-thinkers, Meyer is blind to the outcome of that war: A dark age descended over Greek civilization that was not to be lifted until the renaissance ideals of Solon of Athens achieved predominance hundreds of years later.

We do not need a repeat performance to know where Meyer and his Soros-funded ilk are leading us.

The Story of the Casino World’s Front-Man

by John Hoefle

Running Scared: The Life and Treacherous Times of Las Vegas Casino King Steve Wynn

by John L. Smith

New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 2001
352 pages, paperback, \$15

Running Scared is a carefully written book which its subject, Steven Wynn, nominally one of the most powerful men in Las Vegas, tried hard to stop. Upon reading it, it is easy to see why, for it portrays Wynn as a rage-driven, megalomaniacal front-man, with a reputation for womanizing and cocaine abuse, whose career was steered by mobsters and bankers, funded by dirty money, and aided by the thick layer of corruption which pervades America’s casino capital. The picture painted of Wynn is that of a petty tyrant prone to terrorize his underlings, using his mob connections in private to intimidate, while publicly presenting himself as just another brilliant businessman.

That there are higher powers behind Wynn was made clear in a meeting which occurred shortly after Wynn took over the Golden Nugget casino. Wynn owed \$6,000 to a New Jersey man named Milton Stone, who was having trouble collecting. Stone arranged a meeting with Wynn, but was concerned that he might have trouble with Wynn’s Sicilian bodyguards, so he asked a Sicilian friend to accompany him.

“Milton Stone was uncomfortable, to the amusement of his Sicilian friend,” Smith wrote. “At this point the companion looked at the three men standing about 15 feet away. He spoke to them with a few very private words in Sicilian dialect. Then he focussed his eyes on them and repeated his words.

“Steve Wynn’s heads and eyes turned back and forth as though he was watching a tennis match. It was obvious the little speech in Sicilian was causing the bodyguards concern.

“The bodyguards backed away, showing respect. Suddenly Wynn seemed to soften,” offering his guests lunch and handing Stone a check. “As for the Sicilian bodyguards, they were tripping all over their feet to shake hands with Stone and his companion as the two men departed.”

Wynn’s connection to organized crime was cited by Scotland Yard, which shot down Wynn’s attempt to enter the casino business in London in the early 1980s.